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ABSTRACT
‘Transcendence’ has been a key subject of Western philosophy of religion and history of ideas. 
The meaning of transcendence, however, has changed over time. The article looks at some 
perspectives offered by the nineteenth and the twentieth century Anglo ‑American and con‑
tinental European philosophers of religion and presents their views in relation to the concept 
of transcendence formulated by the Bengali Hindu traditionalist Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati 
(1874–1937). The questions raised are what transcendence in the philosophy of religion is, 
how one can speak of it, and what its goal is. The paper points to parallels and differences in 
epistemology, ontology and practice. One difference is that the nineteenth and the twentieth 
century Western philosophy of religion tended to assume an ontological difference between 
self and transcendence inherited from personalities such as Søren Kierkegaard, but also to 
explore the concept of transcendence beyond the idea of a metaphysical God. Bhaktisiddhanta, 
whose foundational thought mirrors medieval Hindu philosophy of religion and the theistic 
schools of Vedānta, suggests that transcendence has a metaphysical and personal dimension 
that is to some degree ontologically similar to and directly knowable by the self. Bhaktisid‑
dhanta’s approach to transcendence differs from Kierkegaard’s and other Western philosophers’ 
and revolves around the idea of God as a transcendent person that can be directly known mor‑
phologically and ontologically through devotion. The article is a contribution to the history of 
ideas and the philosophy of religion in Eurasia and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION
Exploring philosophies of religion is a tasking exercise that requires compe‑
tence in several areas of thought. The flow of ideas of philosophers and intel‑
lectuals also tends to change over time, which renders the comparison of their 
core structures more difficult. Nonetheless, exploring philosophies of religion 
across regional domains may enrich our understanding of religion although it is 
essential to keep in mind differences in social, cultural, and historical contexts.
The present article explores a number of interpretations on the subject of 
transcendence from authors that can be broadly grouped under the umbrella 
of continental (European) and Anglo ‑American philosophy. At the end it will 
explore writings from the Hindu school of Bengal Vaishnavism represented by 
the intellectual Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati (1874–1937) and draw some pre‑
liminary conclusions.1 The article does not claim to make justice to Western 
philosophy nor to Bengal Vaishnavism given their enormous complexity and 
intellectual history. It will nonetheless point to some examples that may be 
useful for comparison and for future research.
VARIETIES OF TRANSCENDENCE
At the outset it is important to point out that there are several approaches to 
the idea of ‘transcendence’. Åke Sander for example distinguishes between sev‑
eral categories of transcendence related to human experience. The first one is 
con s c iou sne s s  t r an s cendence  (Swed. medvetandetranscendens) (T1) and 
refers to anything that is beyond the awareness of the subject. The immanent 
is in this case the subject’s experience. The latter can be further divided in two 
subcategories: the intention and purpose behind an act (T1.1) and the genuine 
experience of performing the act (T1.2). A second category is s en so r y  t r an‑
s cendence  (sinnestranscendens) (T2), which refers to all that is transcenden‑
tal to the subject’s ordinary perception. Within this category it is important 
to distinguish between: (a) what is empirically transcendental in relation to 
ordinary sense perception due to the limitations of the subject at a particu‑
lar time (T2.1); (b) what is in principle not possible to perceive through the 
senses (T2.2) since the source is beyond the range of human perception and 
human tools.
A third category is expe r i ence  t r an s cendence  (erfarenhetstranscen‑
dens) (T3). According to Sander much of the strength and attraction of the 
‘typical’ religious experience is that it gives access to a deeper, more cohesive 
and truthful reality. Those who had these experiences speak of entering the 
1  For a detailed account of Bhaktisiddhanta’s life and thought see Sardella, 2013.
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deepest recesses of being and the root of existence through an ‘inner eye’, and 
access a dimension of existence that humans are generally unaware of (Sander, 
1988: I, 45). In the course of many religious experiences, the subject is said to 
witness the cradle of life itself, hidden in the deepest recesses of life (Sander, 
1988: 28–31). Experience transcendence is an inner experience beyond ordi‑
nary awareness.
A fourth category is semantic  t ranscendence (semantisk transcendens) (T4). 
It has two distinct subcategories: one that includes phenomena that cannot 
be semantically expressed due to lack of appropriate terms in a language do‑
main (T4.1). The other consists of what in principle cannot be communicated 
through symbols since it is ineffable such as in the case of a religious experience 
of the divine (T4.2).
The fifth and last category is me t aphy s i c a l  t r an s cendence  (metafysisk 
transcendens) (T5). Transcendence refers in this case to that which is beyond 
the external world. This category has also two subcategories. The first one is 
what is generally discussed in theology and philosophy of religion, i.e. a space 
or territory located beyond the physical cosmos explored by the natural sci‑
ences (T5.1). In this sense, transcendence refers to multiple worlds such as 
the Christian transcendental abode of God. The second subcategory (T5.2) 
is linked to the world of everyday experience, generally understood as ‘para‑
mount reality’ (vardagsvärlden). Transcendence here refers to alternate states of 
consciousness, such as in the world of fantasy and imagination, in the world 
of dreams, or in the worlds of the schizophrenic and mentally ill. T5.2 is not 
based on a theory of multiple worlds like T5, but explores alternative patterns 
of experience within the ordinary life ‑world. This subcategory may include ex‑
periences of God if God is understood as immanent to the life ‑world (Sander, 
1988: I, 31).
This article will have a certain focus on a history of ideas relating to the fifth 
category, albeit not exclusively.
TRANSCENDENCE IN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
The word ‘transcendence’ from the Latin term transcendere (to move beyond) 
is generally juxtaposed to the word ‘immanent’ derived from in ‑manere (to stay 
within).2 During the second half of the fifteenth century the distinction be‑
tween transcendence and immanence became an important element of Chris‑
tian theology. From what was thought to be God’s perspective, immanence 
represented the Divine Trinity of God while transcendence referred to God’s 
creation of the finite world expressed in terms of economy (oikonomia) or 
2  I would like to thank Professor Ola Sigurdsson and Professor Åke Sander from the 
University of Gothenburg for commenting on several sections of this article. 
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God’s manifestation through creation, redemption, and consummation. From 
a human perspective immanence was the finite world, which presupposed the 
existence of an infinite creator and a transcendent God. The divine was not 
only transcendent in relation to the finite world but was also beyond the scope 
of reason. God was transcendent in both a metaphysical and epistemological 
sense.
By the early twentieth century, continental philosophy had reached a point 
where the concept of ‘transcendence’ had become disconnected from its earlier 
theological roots. The road, however, had been convoluted. Immanuel Kant 
had professed that only what can become an object of experience (the phe‑
nomena) may be known, while the das Ding an sich (the thing ‑in ‑itself, the 
noumenon) was transcendental. The latter, however, no longer referred to God’s 
transcendence but to the conditions of possibility stemming from the noume‑
non as their cause. Hegel regarded history as an intrinsic part of the rational 
reality of God. Transcendence was an immanent object of reason and in that 
sense did not possess a metaphysical status distinct from the dialectical pro‑
cess of history. During the twentieth century, the concepts of ‘transcendence’ 
and ‘immanence’ were explored by German and French phenomenologists. Ed‑
mund Husserl distinguished between the intention — an integral aspect of 
the stream of consciousness — and the individual transcendental ego, who 
was beyond it. Martin Heidegger defined ‘man’ (as an ontological category) as 
a transcendent Being that strived to reach beyond the experience of objects in 
order to understand Being itself.
KIERKEGAARD
The question of defining the nature of transcendence, however, remained foun‑
dational and was addressed by the important nineteenth century philosophers 
such as Søren Kierkegaard. In Philosophical fragments (Philosophiske Smuler) 
Kierkegaard under the pen name of Johannes Climacus argued that although 
a person may know who she is there was still a paradox that forced her into 
going beyond the known in search for an ‘unknown’, whom Kierkegaard la‑
belled ‘the god’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 37ff.). However, this passionate search for 
knowing the unknown could only bring to the limit of what was known but 
not beyond it. The only reasonable method for proving the nature and exist‑
ence of God was what Kierkegaard, in this particular instance, wrote as ‘just 
wait a little and I shall demonstrate it’ (Kierkegaard, 1985: 43). It was never 
accomplished and always in the making. Simply put, a passionate, unfulfilled 
search for the god was the path to transcendence, according to Kierkegaard’s 
view in this period (1844). Broadly speaking, Kierkegaard appeared to belong 
to the tradition that viewed the divine as ontologically different from individual 
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humans, although in other texts it is possible to discern a closeness and inti‑
macy of spirit between the human and the ‘unknown’ realized in prayer. The 
differentiation between the human and divine sphere was based on a moral gap 
between the perfect ethical nature of God and the human sin against God, an 
ethical gap that had rendered an impossible task to speak of God in any posi‑
tive way.
EPISTEMOLOGY
The rational evaluation of religious claims as true or false was another area of 
investigation in the twentieth century. Philosophical statements that claimed 
truth ‑value about the nature of God and transcendence became the object of 
rigorous historical and philosophical analysis. Logical positivism had main‑
tained in the early decades of the century that scientific language was evidence‑
‑based, but the language and concepts of philosophy and theology were non‑
‑verifiable and thus cognitively meaningless. To address these statements, Dewi 
Zephaniah Phillips — whose thought is rooted in Anglo ‑American philosophy 
— found no faults in a language that spoke of God and a faith situated outside 
the realm of logic. Wittgenstein had suggested that talks of belief made only 
sense within the frame of a given discourse, a so ‑called ‘language ‑game’. Phil‑
lips then suggested that the concepts of God and transcendence were different 
from other kinds of talks, both scientific and ordinary, since their epistemolog‑
ical object was outside the realm of reason. Therefore, according to Phillips, it 
made no sense to say that ‘he [God] may or may not exist’ (Phillips, 1995: 11).
William J. Wainwright put forward another argument, i.e. that participants 
in religious disputes do employ similar criteria in order to assess the mer‑
its of rivalling religious systems. Wainwright provided the example of theistic 
religions of transcendence such as Christianity and Hindu ‑Vaishnavism and 
concluded that a metaphysical system, including its language, discourse, and 
arguments, was often assessed by its opponents by its capacity to make sense 
of all available knowledge in competition with comparable, similar systems 
(Wainwright, 1995: 88). In this sense, language was meaningful as a cognitive, 
rational tool in order to assess competing religious domains and their ideas of 
transcendence.
As the twentieth century progressed it became increasingly important to ac‑
knowledge and address the existence of a plurality of religious systems that of‑
fer competing interpretations of transcendence. Anglo ‑American philosophers 
such as David Basinger attempted to find new epistemological tools. Basinger 
supported the British philosopher John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism 
that viewed all religions as relative products of human efforts in relation to 
o n e transcendent, divine reality, and Alvin Plantinga’s concept of religion as 
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properly basic and foundational, always true for its committed believers and 
practioners. Basinger’s ‘reformed epistemology’ suggested that both views 
could be accommodated by responsibly taking possession of one’s own faith 
and then by increasing one’s respect and appreciation for other religious views.3
TRANSCENDENCE WITHIN THE REACH  
OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE
One key question still remains open: what is transcendence, with or without 
a capital ‘t’? Continental philosophy in the twentieth century took a step away 
from Anglo ‑American preoccupations for the epistemological question of the 
truth of the existence of God and religion discussed above. According to John 
Caputo the ‘God’ of Anglo ‑American philosophy of religion was still the God 
of the philosophers born of Enlightenment modes of thinking (Caputo, 2002: 
2), that ‘God’ was declared dead by continental philosophers. The project of 
epistemology in continental philosophy gave way to an emphasis on how to 
existentially relate to transcendence. Examples of this existential turn are re‑
flected in the ‘unknown’ of Kierkegaard mentioned earlier, but also in the 
‘impossible’ of Jacques Derrida (Derrida, 1993) and the ‘possibility’ of Richard 
Kearney (Kearney, 2002). Increasing focus was placed on the human ability to 
address and respond to transcendence in a meaningful way. As a consequence, 
transcendence came more and more to be understood as an inherent and in‑
trinsic part of human experience.
The French phenomenologist Emmanuel Lévinas, for example, viewed 
metaphysics and transcendence as man’s (here again in an ontological sense) 
relation to an absolute Other, which referred to both the infinite that the word 
‘God’ points to — beyond Being and human imagination — but also to the 
meeting face to face with a ‘human’ Other. The human Other, however, was 
3  Basinger proposed that a ‘reformed epistemologist’ did not have to surrender to a pluralistic 
view, since plausibility was highly subjective in religious discourse (Basinger, 1999: 366ff.). By 
confronting her religious understanding with competing ones, a reformed epistemologist could 
first truly possess and own her belief — beyond affiliation dictated by the cultural environment 
of one’s place of birth — and secondly, she could increase her tolerance and respect for the 
discourses about transcendence presented by others. Plantinga has argued that a specific 
religion is properly basic and foundational, and does not have to be discussed within the frame 
of any other religious view, since it is the unique conceptual frame of reality for those who 
follow it (Plantinga, 1983: 76). Hick had argued — through a rational and comparative study 
of religion parallel to Wainwright’s approach — that religions ultimately were a product of 
human culture and their historical, individual and epistemological context. Religions, however, 
dealt essentially with the same One, Formless, Undifferentiated, Transcendental Reality, a view 
that to some degree resembles the epistemological and ontological perspective of Hindu 
Advaita Vedānta (see Hick, 1982).
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a Being who could not be reduced to any ontological ‘sameness’. It was a meet‑
ing that eventually evoked a foundational ethical response, a profound sense of 
response ‑ability (Lévinas, 1998).
The issue of the gender of transcendence and its cultural ramifications has 
also received attention. According to Ellen T. Armour, religion in the context 
of the West has been based on a vertical relationship between a normative mas‑
culine subjectivity and his perfected mirror image, God (the Father, the Son) 
(Armour, 2002: 223). Luce Irigaray, evoking mystical images such as the rose 
and the abyss, has proposed a return to the immediacy of poetry and singing, 
a divine human way of being that allows appreciation for the rose, the joy of 
light and air as well as the pulse and rhythm of the seasons. But this according 
to Irigaray requires abandoning all projects and being reborn to the immediate 
presence of life and divinity beyond logic and language, risking one’s cherished 
life in the process and allowing oneself to jump in the unknown abyss that al‑
lowed change and rebirth. This new Being implied a reunion with life itself 
in all its components and a being in God that did not deny the important event 
of giving birth and the female identity of being a mother (Irigaray, 2002).
THE PLACE OF LOVE
The relevance of discussing the subject of transcendence is naturally related to 
its ultimate purpose. Whether ethical, existential or ontological, transcendence 
has often been dealt with as a foundational, underlying carrier of meaning. 
In many instances it has been explored as the ultimate goal of existence. One 
important feature of the study of transcendence in the twentieth century con‑
tinental philosophy — with significant parallels in medieval and the twentieth 
century strands of Hindu bhakti (devotion) — is the concept of love.
John Caputo — who on this point mirrors the later writings of Derrida 
— argued for thinking of God as the ‘becoming possible of the impossible’. 
Transcendence was impossible, something whose possibility humans did not 
and could not foresee because of it inaccessibility to the eye, ear, and mind 
(Caputo, 2001: 10). This absolute Other evoked a love which ‘overpowers 
our powers, potencies, and possibilities, and exposes us to something impos‑
sible’ (Caputo, 2001: 31). Transcendence, this impossible, made demands on 
humans, shaking them from the shackles of self ‑love, dragging them into 
service to others, and into something impossible to come in the future. In 
this relationship, according to Caputo, it was not important to know pre‑
cisely what transcendence was. Especially so, since only then humans were 
forced to ask the question posed by Augustine: ‘what do I love when I love 
my God?’ (Caputo, 2001: 31). For Kearney the relationship between humans 
and God was part of a God ‑play that disclosed the loving power of Being 
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itself (Kearney, 2002: 106). By opening to this ‘loving possible’, humans could 
act to make the impossible a bit more possible, and assist God in fulfilling the 
potential of existence (Kearney, 2002: 111).
TRANSCENDENCE IN HINDUISM
Western philosophy of religion is an enormous fields of study and it would 
be meaningless to claim to cover its many currents and variety of perspectives 
through a few examples, even if only for the purpose of comparison. What 
has been stated above, however, covers ideas that had a vast impact in shap‑
ing the concept of transcendence and the discussion of its epistemology and 
ontology in Western philosophy of religion in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century.
Indian philosophy of religion has a similar range of intellectual currents 
that have been explored through centuries of textual studies and commentaries 
and through formal and informal debates. Hindu philosophy counts six main 
orthodox philosophies (the saddarśana). For the sake of offering a parallel with 
a reasonable range of similarities and points of convergence this article will 
next explore the concept of transcendence within the philosophical schools of 
Vedānta in the theistic interpretations offered by Vaishnavism in Bengal — also 
known as Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Gaudiya Vaishnavism has a strong tradition of 
theistic philosophy of religion that in a number of areas can be compared to 
the philosophical reflections about the idea of a personal God found within 
Christianity and in the philosophy of religion in the West. In order to address 
a similar historical period, the article will explore the thought of a twentieth 
century representative of that school, Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati, who founded 
in Calcutta the Gaudiya Math and Mission in 1918.
The philosophical basis of Gaudiya Vaishnavism that Bhaktisiddhanta most 
frequently referred to was formulated during the Middle Ages by the theistic 
philosopher Jiva Gosvami (ca 1513–1598) and his brother Rupa (1489–1564). 
Their teachings where restated in the eighteenth century by Baladeva Vidy‑
abhusana through a Sanskrit commentary to the Vedānta Sūtra — the latter 
being arguably the most widely studied philosophical treatise in Hinduism and 
the key text of Vedānta philosophy.4
Bhaktisiddhanta in his writings about Vedānta answers to three ques‑
tions that have been extensively explored in Continental and Anglo‑
‑American philosophy, but he replies from a different cultural and intellec‑
tual perspective. Here I will summarize some of his ideas presented in two 
original booklets published from his institutions in Madras and Calcutta 
4  A translation with the original Sanskrit of the Vedānta Sūtra, along with a translation of 
Baladeva’s Sanskrit commentary, is found in Chandra Vasu (Vasu, 1974). 
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(Bhaktisiddhanta, 1932; Bhaktisiddhanta, 1933) and in an edition of his col‑
lected works in English (Bhaktisiddhanta, 1989). His replies — here pre‑
sented following a similar order as in the case of Western philosophy dis‑
cussed above — do not represent the entire range of Hindu thought on the 
subject, although they do reflect a good amount of traditional and medieval 
ideas particularly in relation to Vedānta. They may be regarded as a point 
of departure in order to stimulate an informed conversation across different 
philosophical and religious domains.
The questions posed in the following section are: 1) What is the founda‑
tional nature of transcendence? 2) What is the relationship between the self 
and transcendence? 3) What is the ultimate goal?
1. The nature of Transcendence
In The Vedanta: Its morphology and ontology — based on a lecture delivered on 
August 27, 1933 — Bhaktisiddhanta situates the key concern of Vedānta firmly 
within the realm of transcendence and metaphysics:
The Vedanta deals with a theme beyond the finite views of phenomena. The subjects 
dealt with in that particular philosophy is not confined to any part of material space, 
and definite span of time or any object of sensuous perception made up of any sub‑
stance of this Universe (Bhaktisiddhanta, 1933: 6).
According to Bhaktisiddhanta in his interpretation of Vedānta matter (māyā) 
constitutes the external, physical energy — ontologically separated from the 
inner self (ātman) — and is by nature finite and temporary (asat). The self on 
the contrary is situated in transcendence as brahman and is constitutionally 
eternal (sat) (Bhaktisiddhanta, 1989: 265). It is, in other words, not created 
ex nihilo as in Christian thought. The metaphysical, individual self and divine 
transcendence share the same spiritual nature (brahman) but are different in 
size. A personal, transcendent God is the causal, formal, effective, and mate‑
rial source of the world. For the individual, the ‘absolute infinitesimal’, the 
infinite limitless God is ‘unknown’ in the sense that a complete understanding 
is not possible due to the self ’s infinitesimal size (Bhaktisiddhanta, 1933: 9). 
However, since both share the same transcendent nature, a minute degree of 
knowledge (cit) is possible for the self, if she agrees by her free will to open 
up for God’s divine call. This knowledge can be achieved through a process or 
practice (sādhana) that ultimately allows access to transcendence. That practice 
is meditation through sacred sound.
In a way that is both inclusive and pluralistic, God is simultaneously and 
inconceivably (acintya) understood as the non ‑differentiated One (brahman), 
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the all ‑pervading individualised presence next to each individual ātman (the 
paramātma), the supreme transcendent personality (bhagavan) as well as the 
root of the physical world. About this paradox, Bhaktisiddhanta tells that:
[…] both the transcendental manifestation as well as the transformable mundane man‑
ifestation are simultaneously incorporated in the Absolute and differ from Himself like 
the rays of the sun and the glowing disc […]. The analogy is drawn from the sun. The 
spirit, the glowing disc, the emanated rays and the penumbra are the four aspects con‑
cerning the sun and [are] inseparable from the existence of the sun. So the manifested 
world has association with the integral position of the Absolute (Bhaktisiddhanta, 
1933: 32–33).
All the different physical and metaphysical aspects are regarded as real but 
each requires a different epistemological method and approach to the nature of 
reality. Differentiated aspects of transcendence are ultimately non ‑contradictory 
(bheda ‑abheda, simultaneously one and different) since they deal with different 
aspects of the same immense universal reality but also depend epistemologi‑
cally on the limitations posed by the viewer’s focus and individual approach to 
the study of reality. Of all various aspects of transcendence, the transcendental 
personality is viewed as the most complete. This approach to pluralism and 
religious diversity differs from Hick’s understanding of oneness, since different 
interpretations of transcendence are regarded as real in Bhaktisiddhanta’s view, 
and not simply as a product of human culture and religious history. Different 
views of transcendence, however, need to be placed in a scale from more to less 
complete according to their philosophical depth, level of authority and source 
of revelation.
2. Relationship
The relationship between the self and God is viewed as one of loving service 
(bhakti). The self who is temporarily embodied in a biological and mental ma‑
chine (the body and mind) is in actuality a transcendent servant of transcend‑
ence. An often quoted metaphor is that the hand gets no nourishment simply 
by grasping food, but by offering that food to the mouth the hand also receives 
strength from the stomach, which provides nourishment to the whole body. 
In a similar way the transcendent self as a minute particle of brahman — the 
transcendent metaphysical totality and the root cause of all physical and mental 
phenomena — gets its strength from ultimate transcendence. Through service 
the self becomes fulfilled and shares in the profuse ‘givenness’ (prasāda) of 
transcendence. This service develops into a relationship that may take different 
forms according to the individual self ’s desire. It may manifest as a relationship 
as consort, parent, friend, servant, or as neutral:
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The Consort Absolute will wait for the consort servitor. The parent servitor will 
meet the Child Absolute, the object of his or her only engagement. The eternal 
friend servitor will regain his position as such. The personal attendant servitors will 
meet their Master and offer their confidential services, for sheer love. The confiden‑
tial service offered by the neutral entity will indirectly be directed to the Absolute 
without any cognizance on the part of the unalloyed individual spirit (Bhaktisid‑
dhanta, 1933: 31).
Bhaktisiddhanta tells that the focus on transcendent sound is the key for 
approaching transcendence and overcoming the confusion that arises by con‑
tact with the physical world:
The last aphorism of the Vedanta Sutras tends to the impressions that sound will 
bring us to the Region wherefrom a return journey along the path of knowledge is not 
possible. It goes to show a process leading to the transcendence […]. By the constant 
chanting of the Transcendental Name the aim of spiritual aspiration will be fulfilled 
and no other process can remedy the evil of accepting the undeserving position of 
a worldly enjoyer (Bhaktisiddhanta, 1933: 27).
3. The goal
The goal of transcendence is pure love (prema), for which a distinction need to 
be made between the self and the ultimate person:
The different readings of the Vedanta under true guidance will give us the result that 
Personality of Godhead is not approached by identifying oneself with the transcenden‑
tal Effulgence (Brahma) [brahman] coming out from the transcendental Body of the 
Absolute and that the all ‑engrossing features (Paramatma or Universal Godhead) are 
but a part of the Absolute in Whom a freed soul dose not merge (Bhaktisiddhanta, 
1933: 31–32).
According to Bhaktisiddhanta the aim of Vedānta is transcendental love 
(Bhaktisiddhanta, 1932: 9). Vedānta Sūtra states that the goal of transcendence 
and being is found in divine sports and pastimes (līlā), which Bhaktisiddhanta 
reads as the enjoyment of the personal manifestation of transcendence — the 
supreme personality — with his loving servants. These pastimes are permeated 
by ever ‑expanding, transcendental love. According to Gaudiya Vaishnavism, the 
ultimate form (rūpa) of transcendence has perennial, non ‑physical morpho‑
logical manifestations, one in a male form named Krishna and one in a female 
form named Radha. Radha is the morphologic embodiment of the female 
transcendent potency (śakti). The two aspects of transcendence in male and 
female forms are never separated, but constitute one reality with two equally 
important functions. Their love for one another represents the highest level of 
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transcendental love. All selves are in a transcendent sense ‘females’ since they 
are emanations from the ultimate potent and potency. They are also eternally 
subordinated to and depending on it. In the material world, transcendent love 
can be awakened by constant, active remembrance of and service to the call of 
transcendence. Bhaktisiddhanta concluded that reason (buddhi) and philoso‑
phy (jñāna) ultimately failed to understand transcendence and had to be them‑
selves transcended by ‘direct’ knowledge (vijñāna) in relation to transcendence 
awakened by the sound vibration of God’s transcendent names (śabda brah‑
man). This process was meant to evoke the presence of God (Bhaktisiddhanta, 
1933: 27).
Bhaktisiddhanta spells out a mainstream reading of the idea of transcend‑
ence in terms of Hindu philosophy of religion, which is particularly influ‑
ential among the traditionalist schools of bhakti yoga of Vaishnavism and 
Shaivism. It is nonetheless important to point out that the genealogy of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century Hinduism is extremely variegated and plu‑
ralistic. Perhaps the most influential current of philosophical thought among 
intellectuals and middle ‑class Hindus in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century was advaita Vedānta, a monistic, idealist interpretation of Vedānta 
that views transcendence (brahman) as a unified metaphysical reality non‑
‑different ontologically from the self. In the stage of liberation (mukti) the 
self loses its individual identity and merges in the infinite essence of brahman. 
Advaitic thought envisions the world as temporary and as an illusion although 
it is also an inconceivable creation of brahman. Advaita Vedānta has gener‑
ated strong activist movements for social, political and cultural emancipation 
during the late colonial and postcolonial period. It was propagated both in 
India and in the West by personalities such as Rammohun Roy (1772–1833), 
Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), and former president of India Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan (1888–1975).
CONCLUDING WORDS
In the ninetieth and twentieth century, Western philosophy of religion and 
the Hindu schools of Vedānta were among the intellectual streams that paid 
considerable attention to the concept of transcendence. A general, foundational 
difference in relation to talks of ‘God’ — with or without capital ‘g’ — is that 
Western approaches to transcendence — perhaps due to their intellectual links 
with Christian thought — have tended to view transcendence as sharply dif‑
ferentiated from the human sphere — such as in the case of Kant and Kierkeg‑
aard. The schools of Vedānta, on the other hand, here represented by Bhak‑
tisiddhanta, have stressed that transcendence is knowable by humans on the 
conscious level of the metaphysical self through various practices of meditation 
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and yoga. The most widely practiced yoga method within Hinduism is bhakti 
to a personal deity, whose identity is variously understood.
An important parallel between Western and Indic philosophy of religion is 
that although both traditions of thought approach the nature of the body, the 
mind and the self in different terms, they have emphasized at certain stages 
the ultimate importance of personal love in relation to transcendence, be it 
towards a divine being or the human/transcendent Other. Another interesting 
parallel is that in both domains the idea of a personal God has played a sig‑
nificant role.
The schools of Vedānta have been for over a millennium the most influential 
in India, and their firm foundation in transcendence speaks a different language 
to the philosophy of religion compared to the philosophical traditions of the 
West. Nonetheless, it is possible to see parallels, points of contact and proxim‑
ity, particularly in terms of the ontology and epistemology of transcendence, as 
well as the concept of transcendent love.
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